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The Southwest’s Uneven Welcome:  
Immigrant Inclusion and Exclusion  
in Arizona and New Mexico
ROBIN DALE JACOBSON, DANIEL TICHENOR,  
T. ELIZABETH DURDEN
INTRODUCTION
 IN FEW POLICY AREAS IS THE AUTHORITY of the federal gov-
ernment presumed to be more dominant than immigration. In four phases 
during the nineteenth century, the Supreme Court advanced a dictum of 
exclusive federal power to regulate the admission and expulsion of non- 
citizens. In the century that followed, the Court was consistent and unequivo-
cal in expounding the “plenary power” doctrine that “over no other con-
ceivable subject is the power of Congress more complete.”1 Federal laws 
governing immigrant rights have received stricter scrutiny from the courts, 
but again federal authority and policy have routinely trumped state and local 
regulations. Despite these legal verities, however, states have always played a 
pivotal role in governing the inclusion or exclusion of immigrants in Ameri-
can life. State governments preceded their federal counterpart in construct-
ing an elaborate set of regulations controlling immigrant admissions and 
rights, actively recruiting new settlers, and building bureaucratic systems 
and capacities for inspecting and monitoring new arrivals. An important 
and growing literature has begun to highlight the enormous significance 
US states play in governing immigration and immigrant rights.2 But our 
understanding of how different states have influenced the lives of newcomers 
and their families in distinctive ways over time remains remarkably limited.
 To understand how states and contrasting regimes govern newcomers, 
New Mexico and Arizona from their formation in the Progressive Era to 
the Second World War are especially revealing. Today, most immigra-
tion observers in the United States readily acknowledge a wide gulf in 
the reception and membership rights of immigrant communities in these 
two neighboring states. Arizona gained notoriety in 2010 when it enacted 
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6 Journal of American Ethnic History / Spring 2018
legislation—SB1070—requiring state and local law enforcement officers 
to determine the immigration status of anyone involved in a lawful stop, 
detention, or arrest where “reasonable suspicion exists” that the person is 
unlawfully present. As Arizona became ground zero in a contentious struggle 
over porous borders and Latino rights, undocumented immigrants living next 
door in New Mexico were granted driver’s licenses and in- state tuition. New 
Mexico has a broadly celebrated Latino heritage and a strong emphasis on 
integration in which community groups and state and local governments 
work together to incorporate the foreign- born into the collective fabric.3 
These contrasting governing regimes for immigrants have deep historical 
roots unseen on the surface level of contemporary American politics. As we 
demonstrate in this article, these governing regimes of immigration reflect 
significant and distinctive relationships that developed over time between 
each of these states as well as with the nation. The history of immigrants in 
these two states also shows that contemporary contrasts obscure a check-
ered past in New Mexico as well as areas of policy convergence reflecting 
complex developmental pathways.
 The contrasts between Arizona and New Mexico in terms of immigrant 
governance today are particularly striking due to their shared geography 
and historical annexation into the United States, as well as their shared 
border with Mexico. Both drafted constitutions and made a case for state-
hood in identical years. And by far the largest immigrant group in each of 
these southwestern states comes from Mexico. Yet how do we explain the 
notable variations in the immigrant- governing regimes in these two states? 
Equally important, why did New Mexico in the past at times pursue policies 
that were repressive toward newcomers of particular ethnic backgrounds, 
an approach seemingly at odds with its inclusionary traditions and contem-
porary reputation?
 Linda Noel’s exemplary research on New Mexican pluralism and Arizo-
nan marginalization strategies during statehood debates of the early twen-
tieth century serves as an important starting point. Strikingly, Noel finds 
that the complex national political debates and policy outcomes concerning 
immigrants in this period were influenced by how Arizona and New Mexico 
framed the relationship between Mexicans and American identity. Indeed, 
after examining processes of marginalization and pluralism in the origins 
of Arizona and New Mexico, Noel leaves behind the individual states to 
illuminate how these strategies were employed in immigration politics on the 
national stage. For reasons all too familiar to immigration policy scholars, 
pluralist ideals were overwhelmed in the 1920s by marginalization blueprints 
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that elevated notions of the temporary Mexican worker in national debates 
over immigration restriction. Furthermore, Noel illustrates the common 
ground found between those using a marginalization strategy and the exclu-
sionists to explain the repatriation of Mexican workers in the 1930s.4
 While Noel’s writing on the legacy of statehood debates in the American 
Southwest sheds light on national political responses to Mexican immigrants 
writ large, our interest in this subject is driven more by similarities and 
variations in how Arizona and New Mexico responded to new immigrants 
and national political pressures in the early decades of the twentieth century. 
Put another way, an important story can be told about immigrant inclu-
sion and exclusion in the states that complements national conceptions of 
belonging. Pluralist and marginalization approaches evolve in Arizona and 
New Mexico, separate from their use at the national level, and impact the 
treatment of not just Mexicans or Mexican Americans, but other immigrant 
groups as well, often in unexpected ways. This article argues that while at 
its founding, New Mexico was a more inclusive space for a Mexican- origin 
population and Mexican immigrants, other immigrant groups received a 
chillier if not repressive response. In particular, New Mexico highlights 
ways in which inclusive political culture and policies do not extend to all 
immigrants but only immigrants who have already fought for and won 
inclusion for their cultural or racial identity. Inclusion of some often rests 
on triangulation with other “outsiders.” For its part, Arizona continually 
refused to integrate immigrants and non- white ethnics into their state, but 
remained steadily reliant on immigrant labor. As we shall see, Arizona would 
follow a model not dissimilar from the Southern Confederacy, driven by 
the twin catalysts of economic expediency and racial hierarchy. In surpris-
ing ways, then, our Southwestern research uncovers that inclusion can be 
racially specific while at the same time exclusion does not have to be so. 
These insights lead us to argue for a more cautious understanding of what 
counts as an inclusive or exclusive state, a binary that has been present in 
much work on state- level immigration policy.5 New Mexico and Arizona 
complicate neat categorization of inclusion and exclusion and help us see 
patterns of long- term political development and historical (in)consistency. 
Our findings also highlight the extent to which immigrant experiences, even 
in relation to key national policies, often vary across states.
 This article trains a spotlight on immigration politics and policies in Ari-
zona and New Mexico in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 
We begin by briefly discussing the distinctive constitutional and statehood 
struggles in Arizona and New Mexico, yielding divergent power structures 
JAEH 37_3 text.indd   7 3/26/18   11:06 AM
This content downloaded from 
            134.82.100.109 on Mon, 18 Mar 2019 12:56:19 UTC              
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
8 Journal of American Ethnic History / Spring 2018
and claims to national belonging that cast long shadows on how each state 
received immigrants and responded to federal demands and national issues 
of the day. The bulk of this article, however, carefully examines how Arizona 
and New Mexico sought to govern two key immigrant groups—new Euro-
pean arrivals and Japanese settlers—during their formative years through 
World War II. This in- depth historical comparison of two neighboring south-
western states with conflicting ideological traditions and power structures 
provides a glimpse of the analytical value of studying subnational places 
of immigrant inclusion and exclusion.
ETHNIC pOWER AND SUBJUGATION  
IN THE SOUTHWEST STATEHOOD DEBATES
 The contrasting strategies and claims advanced by Arizona and New 
Mexico in their pursuit of new constitutions, statehood, and national stand-
ing can be traced to the relationship between Anglos and people of Mexican 
descent in these adjacent territories during the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries. The Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, ratified in 1848, 
forcibly incorporated roughly 525,000 square miles of previously Mexican 
territory, bringing an estimated 75,000 people of Mexican descent under 
US jurisdiction. Most of these long- term natives of what we now call the 
US Southwest lived along the Rio Grande: sixty thousand in the territory 
that would become the state of New Mexico, only one thousand in Arizona, 
and the rest in California, Texas, and Colorado.6 These nativos or Hispano 
Americanos had one year to accept US citizenship, and with it full rights 
and immunities under the law, which nearly all did.
 Arizona began as a far less populous state than its neighbor but grew 
steadily as federal legislation in the late nineteenth century (including the 
Desert Lands Act of 1877 and the Dawes Act of 1887) distributed land at 
low cost and with few restrictions to new Anglo settlers. The Army Corps 
of Engineers and Reclamation Service also initiated irrigation projects in 
this period that directly benefited new Anglo farming, ranching, and mining 
ventures and corporations, while shifting water away from small landholders 
of Mexican descent.7 The historian David Berman estimates that the Latino 
population in Arizona dropped sharply from 45 percent of the state’s total 
population in 1870 to just 20 percent by the turn of century. In addition, 
over time those of Mexican descent in Arizona increasingly were Mexican 
immigrants and temporary workers who came to fill unskilled jobs for large 
Anglo mining, ranching, and agricultural operations.8
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 By contrast, New Mexico from the start had the largest population of 
Spanish- speaking people in the region. With roughly sixty thousand of 
the roughly seventy- five thousand original Hispanos residing in the state’s 
territory when it was forcibly incorporated into the United States in 1848, 
this group remained the majority in New Mexico in the decades that fol-
lowed. By 1900, scholars estimate somewhere between 50 and 75 percent 
of New Mexico’s 195,000 residents were of Mexican descent. Unlike the 
many disenfranchised Mexican Americans in Arizona, Hispanos exercised 
considerable political clout in New Mexico, where they comprised at least 
half of the votes (but usually more), had influence in both major parties, 
and held notable shares of local and state elected offices during the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.9
 The fact that people of Mexican descent were numerous, economically 
diverse, and politically influential in New Mexico was anathema to the Anglo 
American economic and political elite of Arizona. Indeed, these territories 
formally separated during the Civil War era precisely because Anglo Ameri-
cans migrating west came to dominate Arizona while Anglo newcomers 
shared power with the more dominant Hispanos of New Mexico. As Ginger 
C. Stull writes, it was a fundamental divide “ . . . between Hispanic American 
populations in what is now New Mexico who wanted the rights [guaranteed 
by the Treaty of Hidalgo] protected, and Anglo American populations in what 
is now Arizona who were denying Spanish speakers the rights to vote, hold 
office and participate in schools.”10 For four decades, these contrasts between 
neighboring territories received negligible attention. In the Progressive Era, 
however, these two territories gained prominence on the national agenda 
when the US Senate Committee on Territories, led by Albert Beveridge 
(R- IL), conducted a fact- finding tour in the Southwest that placed a heavy 
emphasis on ethnic, racial, and linguistic characteristics of Arizonan and 
New Mexican populations. Beveridge supported US expansion but opposed 
statehood for territories with large Latino, Asian, or Native American popula-
tions. During hearings in New Mexico, Beveridge and his colleagues worried 
about bilingualism and Hispano influence across the territory.
 Against this backdrop, the federal government proposed in 1906 to join 
the two territories into a single state as a means of mitigating the influence 
of Hispanos and fostering greater Anglo American control over the entire 
region. The Arizona Territory immediately protested, however, arguing that 
its unchallenged regime of Anglo American dominance over economic, 
social, and political life would be compromised by New Mexico’s con-
trasting system of ethnic power- sharing. Striking differences in language 
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policy for education, elections, and government business was an especially 
important flashpoint between the territories.
 The quest for statehood meant that each territory had to make its own 
individual case to the president and Congress. The Senate Committee on 
Territories stated that both states must limit Spanish in an official capacity. 
More specifically, the use of interpreters would not be allowed in conducting 
affairs of the government. Furthermore, public schools were to be conducted 
entirely in English. Consistent with its history of power sharing between 
Hispanos and Anglo Americans, the New Mexican constitution defied the 
edicts of the Senate Committee on Territories by stipulating three provi-
sions to protect Spanish. The constitution stated that persons did not have 
to speak English to vote, hold office, or sit on a jury. Training was provided 
so that teachers could become proficient in both English and Spanish, and 
children of Spanish descent would never be classed in separate schools. The 
constitution did, however, also state that public schools would be conducted 
in English.11 There was a language difference but not a racial chasm in New 
Mexico; the state was defining Hispanos as being “of Spanish descent” but 
not a separate race. The founding documents, however, recognize the threat 
of racial discrimination and its authors wrote protections into the initial 
constitution: “This State shall never enact any law restricting or abridging 
the right of suffrage on account of race, color, or previous condition of ser-
vitude.” As additional protection, the constitution reaffirms the inviolability 
of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hildago in its bill of rights.
 The constitution of Arizona, in striking contrast, required language of 
instruction to be in English and provided no allowance for public docu-
ments or ballots to be translated into Spanish.12 Legislation within the first 
year of statehood furthered discrimination based on language: “No person 
who cannot speak, write and read the English language shall be eligible to 
hold any State, county, or precinct office in the State of Arizona. . . .”13 This 
ensured Arizona would not face the same power sharing in the near future as 
that experienced in New Mexico, where over half the initial representatives 
were Hispanos. Additionally, in that first year Arizona passed legislation that 
stated, “All schools must be taught in the English Language.”14 Arizona’s 
exclusive understanding of American identity as white, and white as tied 
to English and an Anglo culture, was more in step with understandings of 
belonging across the country.
 Arizona and New Mexico, each securing statehood in 1912, employed 
contrasting strategies on how to sell their worthiness to the larger United 
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States. Arizona marginalized Mexican heritage, explicitly arguing that the 
Mexican descendants would either remain under the control of the dominant 
Anglos or return to their own country. In contrast, New Mexico pursued 
an inclusive strategy with regards to the existent Hispano population. Ari-
zona’s tactic, more aligned with dominant federal understandings of race 
and American identity, firmly situated the state within the nation, opening up 
space for Arizona to align with anti- federal racist ideologies and a virulent 
early nativism.
 In contrast to Arizona’s racist, anti- immigrant politics in early state-
hood, New Mexico consciously argued that the Mexican origin population 
within their territory would become members of the United States as 
Spanish Americans, much like the European ancestors of other Ameri-
cans. This relied on triangulation against other “outsiders” at the moment, 
both Indians and African Americans.15 New Mexico pushed to include 
Hispanos, even without cultural assimilation, specifically calling on their 
right to speak Spanish.16 The New Mexican fight for inclusion of this 
population, however, resulted in institutional resources that future citizens 
could draw on for defense of a limited ethnic pluralism.17 It also resulted 
in a state with an insecure footing in American identity, an insecurity 
that would allow cultural concerns to drive much of the response to early 
immigration.
 Reductionist accounts of the origin stories of Arizona and New Mexico 
could conclude that the inclusion and exclusion evident in present- day leg-
islation is a direct legacy of diverging approaches taken to secure statehood. 
As we detail below, however, a more complicated reality unfolds in both 
states, as New Mexico’s defense of its Hispano population not only led to 
an insecure place within white American identity but also encouraged an 
exclusionary response to other immigrant groups. Due to economic con-
cerns read through the lenses of racial hierarchies and states’ rights, Arizona 
pushed to keep immigrants within its borders when doing so served those 
in power. Through close historical analysis, we see the nuanced official 
responses of Arizona and New Mexico to both European and Japanese 
immigrant groups, approaches that challenge simple characterizations of 
New Mexico as inclusive and Arizona as exclusionary. Extending from their 
distinctive origins and struggles for statehood, we shall discern the lasting 
importance of contrasting ethnic group power and claims to national belong-
ing as each state responded to both new immigration and fresh pressures 
from the federal government.
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THE INCLUSION AND ExCLUSION  
OF EUROpEAN IMMIGRANTS
 The competing traditions of limited pluralism and racial subjugation 
dominant in New Mexico and Arizona help us understand their early 
responses to immigrant groups from Europe. The unique ethnic power 
sharing that defined New Mexico from early statehood did not create a 
broadly inclusive pluralism. In fact, we see a heightened need for state 
symbolic action that sharpened the edges around the distinctive claims to 
an American identity that included those of Spanish descent by exclud-
ing others. Calls for exclusion and targeting of other suspect European 
immigrants as a contrast to Spanish Americans was one attempt to shore 
up acceptance of New Mexico as part of the United States. Arizona’s mar-
ginalization strategy for achieving statehood also echoed through their early 
nativist stances against Europeans, but with different outcomes for Euro-
pean immigrants in the state. Calls for exclusion appeared when European 
immigrants presented a challenge to the racially segmented and pliable 
workforce; if, however, immigrants could be incorporated into such a labor 
market while still promoting Anglo dominance, no such vibrant calls for 
restriction emerged.
 Serving as Arizona’s first governor from 1912 to 1917 and again from 
late 1917 to 1919, George W. P. Hunt, a Democrat and successful business-
man, took the lead in rousing state government to restrict immigrant rights 
and admissions for “new” European immigration and other newcomers 
deemed undesirable. In December 1914, Hunt and the state lawmakers 
worked together to codify an “Act to Protect the Citizens of the United 
States in Their Employment against Noncitizens of the United States.” The 
measure required any Arizona employer of more than five workers “regard-
less of kind or class of work or sex of workers” to reserve at least 80 percent 
of their positions for native- born workers.18 This was designed to favor 
native- born English, Irish, German, Scandinavians, and other older stock 
groups. “Other persons of European descent such as Italians, Spaniards, and 
those from Eastern Europe were not considered full members of the broader 
‘white’ community,” as Luis Plascencia explains. “This racialized scheme 
positioned Mexicans below these two groups, and Native Americans below 
Mexicans.”19 Under the new law, employers who failed to adhere to this 
mandate faced $100 fines and possible imprisonment, as did workers who 
falsely claimed native citizenship to obtain employment. Less than a year 
after its enactment, the US Supreme Court ruled that the legislation violated 
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the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. As Charles Evans 
Hughes’s majority opinion noted,
It is sought to justify this act as an exercise of the power of the State to 
make reasonable classifications in legislating to promote the health, safety, 
morals and welfare of those within its Jurisdiction. But this admitted 
authority, with the broad range of legislative discretion that it implies, 
does not go so far as to make it possible for the State to deny to lawful 
inhabitants, because of their race or nationality, the ordinary means of 
earning a livelihood. It requires no argument to show that the right to work 
for a living in the common occupations of the community is of the very 
essence of the personal freedom and opportunity that it was the purpose 
of the Amendment to secure.20
 Undaunted by this judicial setback, Hunt warned in 1916 that Arizona 
could not flourish so long as traditional Northern and Western European 
settlers were overshadowed by Mexicans and “new” Europeans. Reporting 
to state lawmakers that 55.5 percent of convicts in Arizona prisons and 55.1 
percent of patients at the State Hospital for the Insane were of “alien blood” 
or “belong either to Mexican or other foreign races,” Hunt questioned “why 
the State of Arizona should continue to encourage a kind of immigration 
that imposes upon the taxpayers between 50 and 60 percent of the total 
expense incurred for the care of deficient classes.”21 Hunt’s animus toward 
“foreign races” was shared not only by Arizona legislators, but also by the 
state’s congressional delegation.
 During World War I, however, questions about labor created clashing 
interests on the question of immigration admittance. The focus on maintain-
ing a racially segregated labor force can be seen in the call from Arizona to 
loosen up restrictions for Mexican immigrants. Cotton growers in southern 
Arizona were especially vexed by restrictions on their access to Mexican 
migrant labor as a result of the 1917 literacy and head tax. Arizona Senator 
Carl Hayden joined other western and southern lawmakers in advocating 
for the “temporary admission of illiterate Mexicans” in the late 1910s and 
early 1920s. Arizona governor Thomas Campbell wrote Hayden in 1920 
that he was “being importuned by the agricultural forces in the State” to 
allow “the importation of Mexican labor for the sole purpose of relieving 
the agricultural labor shortage here.” Hayden also received urgent requests 
for assistance in facilitating Mexican labor from the president of the Arizona 
Chamber of Commerce and other business leaders. The same year, Hayden 
testified to the House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization that 
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access to Mexican foreign labor was essential: “There is no other way of 
meeting the immediate agricultural labor needs in southern Arizona, except 
by the temporary admission of Mexicans.”22 He added that this arrangement 
would be mutually beneficial for Mexican laborers and Arizona employers. 
“Arizona and Sonora are separated by an arbitrary border line,” he insisted, 
“with people on the Mexican side seeking this seasonal work and people on 
the American side needing their assistance.”23 While politicians worked to 
create pathways into Arizona for Mexican laborers, many of whom could 
return to Mexico, new European workers in the early 1920s were a threat 
to Anglo workers.
 New Mexico, however, more concerned about cementing its place in 
America than on its labor needs, became focused on routing out disruptive 
forces rather than maintaining or recruiting foreign workers. The depths 
of suspicion and exclusion from American identity faced by New Mexico 
can be seen in a 1918 letter to the editor entitled “America’s Unguarded 
Gateway” that appeared in The North American Review under the pseud-
onym Henry Wray. The author suggested the southern border with Mexico 
presented a danger to America in wartime:
South of the American- Mexican border, lives a race that is strange to us 
and little understood. It is of mixed blood, interbred, and physically and 
mentally degenerate. The average Mexican is burrow- like, stubborn, un-
certain, ignorant and vindictive. Within his vestigial body blazes a hatred 
for the gringo and the gringo’s country. He has an intense disgust for the 
cowardly gringo and thirsts to spill gringo gore.
 Germany could use this hatred, suggested Wray: “A few German officers 
and some German gold effectively placed could assemble this army and 
start it northward.” New Mexico, Wray continued, is more Mexican than 
American, presenting a key threat to the country in this time of war:
The State has remained Mexican in every sense of the word. One may 
travel a hundred miles, pass through town after town and be unable to con-
verse in any language save Spanish. There are whole districts without any 
English speaking persons, where the school boards and school teachers are 
unable to read, write, or speak English. All school teachers are compelled 
by the State to be examined in Spanish. The legislature is conducted in 
Spanish. The courts, State and Federal, are conducted in Spanish. A foreign 
language is one of the most potent aids to the success of a conspiracy. By 
retaining Spanish as the language of the courts, schools, public gather-
ings, press, religion and politics, the Mexican population of New Mexico 
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keeps itself Mexican. And it looks forward to the Mexican day when New 
Mexico will again take her rightful place as a state of Mexico.
 The controversy that followed this publication reveals the centrality of 
concerns about New Mexico’s belonging that informed the state’s responses 
to federal pressures and immigration long after achieving statehood. County 
councils, concerned citizens, the Education Conference and others from 
across the state expressed outrage at such questioning of New Mexico’s 
loyalty. The chairman of the Executive Committee of the State Council of 
Defense, Charles Springer, wrote to the US Assistant Attorney General that 
the article was a “jumble of vicious and malignant lies about the people of 
New Mexico and conditions existing in the State, and as to the loyalty of 
our people. It is unnecessary to state here that the loyalty and patriotism 
of the American citizens of Spanish ancestry . . . have been demonstrated 
beyond question by their support of the Government in three wars.” Ameri-
can citizens of Spanish ancestry were not referred to as Spanish American 
citizens at this time, distinguishing them from other ethnic groups that 
might be “hyphenated” Americans. Springer wanted the author of this piece 
to be prosecuted; the “vicious attacks . . . that a state of treason exists in 
this part of the United States . . . should be punishable under the amended 
Espionage Act or other laws.”24 Similar to its claims for statehood, New 
Mexico’s claims for inclusion of citizens despite their Spanish heritage or 
use of the Spanish language did not extend to calls for inclusion for other 
language or ethnic groups.
 New Mexico, like many other states, used language and education policy 
as a key tool for anti- German campaigns during World War I. Thirty- one 
states issued legislation between 1917 and 1921 either making English the 
language of instruction or limiting the teaching of foreign languages in 
elementary schools.25 Interestingly, Arizona was not among those states. 
The state’s original documents already instructed Arizona public schools to 
use English. The bilingualism written into the constitution of New Mexico, 
on the other hand, required the need to address the anti- German hysteria 
in policy. Earlier inclusive policies actually opened the door, not for more 
inclusive policies generally, but for restrictive policies in later moments of 
national nativism toward different racial or ethnic groups.
 New Mexico’s Board of Education in early April of 1918 passed a reso-
lution recommending that German be taken out of the public schools. On 
April 21, the Board of Regents of the University of New Mexico decided 
to discontinue teaching German.26 The chair of the county council wrote to 
JAEH 37_3 text.indd   15 3/26/18   11:06 AM
This content downloaded from 
            134.82.100.109 on Mon, 18 Mar 2019 12:56:19 UTC              
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
16 Journal of American Ethnic History / Spring 2018
the state council that “it was the unanimous feeling of the members of the 
county council of defense that it would be unwise at this time for a university 
or school anywhere in the state of New Mexico to employ an alien enemy in 
teaching, as we all felt that such relations could not be harmonious and that 
the greatest opportunity in this country for combating German propaganda 
and inculcating patriotism is through our public schools and colleges.”27 In 
1919, New Mexico passed a law making English the language of instruction 
in public elementary schools.28
 Different expressions of the hysteria and 100 percent Americanism dur-
ing World War I in the Southwest stemmed from the legacies of statehood 
strategies, both the contested and insecure belonging in New Mexico and the 
neo- confederate origins of Arizona. These contrasting orientations altered 
approaches to Germans and German Americans and enforcement of war-
time loyalty. After passage of the Espionage Act of 1917, people across the 
country were reporting on their neighbors’ so- called street talk, anything 
that questioned the righteousness or the inevitable success of the United 
States in the war, the failure to buy bonds, or failure to perform patriotic 
acts that would suggest a disloyal nature. In New Mexico, many of these 
accusations made their way through county and state councils of defense 
and to federal prosecutors. In contrast, Arizona had difficulty organizing 
the state and local councils of defense29 and such formal channels were 
supplemented by private actions. While Arizonans suspected of such crimes 
were formally charged through federal courts, a range of state and local 
organizations as well as communities also took matters into their own hands, 
accusing, judging, and meting out their own punishment.
 New Mexico demonstrated vigorous participation in the wartime federal 
programs monitoring “enemy aliens” and other pro- German activity. The 
New Mexico Council of Defense received numerous reports of disloyalty: 
individuals being offered money to be German spies, teachers avowedly pro- 
German, Jewish postmasters sowing disloyalty among the “natives” (here 
meaning Spanish Americans), and hospitals refusing to fly an American 
flag because “every person up there is an Alien,” among other complaints. 
The New Mexico Council of Defense received “so many stories of Pro- 
Germans and disloyalty these days that we do not believe any of them until 
they are corroborated.”30 In letters to the Council of Defense of the State 
of New Mexico, Germans were described as being “lower” than Indians or 
generally unable to be trusted. A rancher wrote: “The case of the German- 
American is so important that it should be considered by itself. While I am 
confident, . . . that the great majority of New Mexico German- Americans 
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are perfectly loyal in act and intent, at the same time I notice among them 
. . . a tendency to a certain dishonesty of view that rules out complete 
mental loyalty on their part.” During World War I, New Mexico was stuck 
between the national distrust of German and other “hyphenated” Americans 
and a defense of their state and its Spanish American population as loyal 
Americans. The move to claim an American identity for Spanish- speaking 
citizens did not, however, soften the anti- German rhetoric in the state. 
Tomas Jaehn states that during World War I, ethnic Germans encountered 
not only suspicion but accusations and actions. Even if we were to accept 
his characterization of these hostilities as “mild” and “insignificant,”31 the 
existence of anti- German sentiment within New Mexico is keenly notable 
in contrast to its embrace of Spanish and Mexican Americans at its time of 
statehood. This ethnically distinctive state frequently used formal channels 
to report on suspicious Germans, and its visible actions against the German 
language were used as public signals to assert belonging in the American 
political community.
 While New Mexico was emphasizing its key place within the United 
States, Arizona, more certain of its Americanness, was engaging in acts 
protective of the nation but also protective of Arizona, distinct from the 
nation. As previously established, Arizona had established its American cre-
dentials through earlier racial and linguistic restrictions.32 While editorials 
in Arizona newspapers indicated suspicion toward Germans, the incidents of 
prosecution and persecution crossed ethnic boundaries. Germans in Arizona, 
along with others, faced attacks from private organizations and vigilante 
groups. A mob attempted to shave the corners off a German resident’s mus-
tache.33 Mexicans and Mexican Americans also fell victim to the wartime 
loyalty concerns. In Bisbee, a sixteen- year- old Mexican student reportedly 
refused to salute the flag one afternoon. After a two- hour hearing, class-
mates determined the punishment for the “rebellious alien” was to learn the 
Star- Spangled Banner and perform it while saluting the flag. Should he fail 
to do so, he would be forced to carry a flag all day while being subject to 
beatings from the student court members. Another “Mexican” worker who 
did not salute the flag when requested almost met serious injury by a mob 
in Prescott. This person was saved from the mob by a judge and thrown in 
jail to await a trial. Newspapers reported prosecution of utterances about 
the war effort in federal courts in Arizona or through community- enforced 
sanctions such as tar and feathering, forced saluting of flags and other pub-
lic displays of shaming and forced patriotism, as well as beatings. These 
accounts suggest, however, that Germans or German Americans were not 
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central targets, but one group of many, as most do not carry any indication 
of the ethnic background of the accused.34
 Arizona displayed a vigilante vigor in its policing of loyalty; this, however, 
was primarily about radical labor and the rough and tumble world of party 
politics in the state. Concerns about disloyalty in Arizona were dominated 
by attacks on the IWW and the broader Red Scare campaign. Throughout 
World War I gubernatorial candidates used loyalty as a central dividing line, 
headlines regularly connected strikes, unions, and loyalty to America, and 
politicians of all levels in the state were asked to make explicit statements 
about their views on the possible disloyalty of the IWW. Germans—to the 
extent that they were part of the larger subversive work force—faced threats 
from the state and local communities. And Mexicans—to the extent that 
they were good workers—were understood as loyal. Consequently the state 
would fight the federal government for their admittance into the racially 
subjugated workforce. For Arizona, then, debates about belonging happened 
at the intersection of labor and loyalty, with ethnicity playing a secondary 
and supporting role.
 In relation to European immigrants, New Mexico worked to publicly 
exclude ethnic others as a way to reinforce its own identity and worthiness 
as an American state. New Mexico’s tolerance did not extend beyond those 
who already shared power (Anglos and Hispanos). Due to the previous work 
undertaken by Arizona to establish its identity as racially and linguistically 
pure, a display of anti- German sentiment was not needed to underscore the 
loyalty and even patriotism of the state, and therefore focused on the threat 
to the labor market in the state. Arizona’s response to immigrants continued 
to be founded in economic concerns.
ANTI- JApANESE SENTIMENT
 Looking at the response to Japanese immigrants in the first half of the 
twentieth century, we see more similarities than differences between the 
treatment Japanese received in Arizona and New Mexico. The limited 
inclusion developed toward Hispanos and Mexicans in New Mexico did 
not extend to Asian immigrants, as New Mexico joined its Southwestern 
neighbor and much of the West in a sustained campaign limiting the rights 
of Japanese and Japanese Americans from statehood through World War 
II. Despite small numbers of Japanese workers and residents, both states 
jumped on the regional bandwagon to call for restrictions on Japanese 
immigration, to set up barriers for Japanese to own land, and ultimately 
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to play key roles in internment.35 The fact that states with very different 
approaches to dealing with the meeting of a Mexican population created 
similar legislation to limit rights or prevent residence of Japanese immi-
grants illuminates the limited reach of New Mexico’s push against white 
supremacy. New Mexican tolerance and an established sense of a tri- cultural 
state (i.e., Anglos, Hispanos, and Mexicans) provided no protection to the 
Japanese in the early twentieth century. In fact, for a state uncertain of 
its place in American identity, publicly excluding a race that was being 
demonized in the nation was important, even if the economic competition 
was not a large concern. In Arizona, however, the centrality of economic 
exploitation to sustain Anglo dominance led similar anti- Japanese policies 
to have different implications for those living within the state.
 Arizona was an early adopter of the anti- alien land laws, attempting to 
restrict immigrants’ ability to own land, targeting those from Asia and in 
particular from Japan. Arizona passed such a law in 1913, the same year 
as California.36 In 1921, Arizona passed an additional measure tightening 
restrictions on landholding in an attempt to remove loopholes that might 
let family members hold land for the Japanese.37 New Mexico joined in the 
anti- Japanese movement as well in 1921; Governor Mechem’s list of recom-
mended legislative measures for that year included an alien land law and a 
law preventing non- citizens from possessing firearms.38 Later that year the 
New Mexican constitution was amended to exclude individuals ineligible 
for citizenship and corporations whose majority stockholders fell into that 
category from owning land.
 By joining the anti- Japanese movement in the western states, despite 
limited economic competition, New Mexico made a clear statement that 
although Spanish Americans were included side by side with Anglos, this 
inclusion did not extend to others. In the face of a rumor of forty Japanese 
families considering moving to Mesilla Valley, the farm bureau of Donna 
County wrote in the Las Cruces Republican:
The Spanish American population of the state, and the American, get along 
very nicely together—one supplies the majority of the labor, the other the 
bulk of the capital. There is practically no antipathy between them, in fact, 
some of the former are among the most influential and progressive in our 
state, and the vast majority are no longer Spanish- American, but just plain 
American, rapidly adopting the standards of living and education of the 
American, and seeking not to lower the standards, as does the Jap, but 
to come up to the American standard. He is a citizen of long standing, in 
fact, the first in the state in the point of time.39
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 Making an argument for the exclusion of the Japanese required a force-
ful distinction between the Spanish Americans and this new racial other. 
Spanish Americans, they argued, evidently belonged because of their long 
history of citizenship and similar standards of living as Anglos, both relics 
of the strategies developed during the statehood debates. The Japanese, on 
the other hand, would work for lower wages and undercut the American 
standard of living. As farmers in the border valley attempted to raise the 
alarm about the threat of the Japanese, they drew on racialized fears of the 
inability of Japanese to assimilate, religious differences, miscegenation, and 
permanent loyalty to another country.40 The Las Cruces Republic in 1920 
told New Mexico to “Wake Up”: “The Japanese are industrious, they are 
good farmers—perhaps better than the average American—but they are not 
Anglo- Saxon and never can be. . . . Will you look pleasantly on the picture 
of your daughter being brought up in the public schools with a yellow boy 
as her seat mate, with his oriental ideas of morality? . . . Let us not allow 
cowardly diplomacy to force another mixture in our already over mixed 
race.”41 Racialized arguments to exclude the Japanese from land ownership, 
heard throughout the West, carried a different meaning in New Mexico. 
Acceptance of the tri- cultural pluralism of New Mexico led to drawing a 
tight circle around those groups and a need to exclude racialized others. 
While limited economic competition in the border area may account for the 
origins of concerns about the Japanese, economic threat does not explain 
why the restrictions on alien land ownership were approved by the state’s 
voters in 1921. As anti- Japanese sentiment swept through the West, Anglos 
and Hispanos throughout New Mexico joined together to alienate Asians, 
underscoring what Jamie Bronstein labels New Mexico’s “nationalist bona 
fides.”42
 In Arizona, alien land laws were far from symbolic but part of the ongo-
ing contested politics around subjugation of non- whites who had a role to 
play economically but not socially or politically. Despite the land laws of 
Arizona, by 1930 there were over one hundred independent Japanese farms 
in Maricopa County. Anti- Japanese feelings came to a head in 1934 when 
farmers formed an “Orientals Exclusion League” and announced a “Jap 
Moving Day” on August 25th, a day by which all Japanese should leave 
Phoenix. The threat to diplomatic relations if expulsion or violence were 
to occur drew the attention of the national and international community. 
Governor Moeur of Arizona received worried telegrams from the Japanese 
Consulate in Los Angeles and the US Acting Secretary of State. The Brit-
ish Consul contacted the governor saying that there were threats of mob 
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violence against the East Indian community. The governor’s response to each 
of these inquiries was very similar; he was sure that the “common sense of 
the people of Arizona will prevent any violence” and that “the laws of this 
state will be enforced without fear or favor.”43 At first, the governor’s reas-
surances seemed an accurate prediction. The threat of forced removal did 
not occur by the date announced, but court proceedings did begin against 
the Japanese for violating the Alien Land Law. Such “common sense,” 
however, did not last.
 From September through November, violence against the Japanese, 
including shooting, bombing, flooding of farms, and arson, occurred in 
the Salt River Valley, bringing criticism from forces within Arizona, as 
well as from Washington, DC, and Japan. The Japanese government again 
appealed directly to the governor as well as the Secretary of State to stop 
such incidents. Governor Moeur responded to the Japanese embassy’s retell-
ing of the acts of terror against Japanese farmers with a statement that “there 
has not been, and from every indication will not be, any serious violence.” 
He attributed specific incidents to “communistic or ‘Red’ activities in the 
Salt River Valley,” putting the origins of any unrest back onto the federal 
government, whom he implored to cooperate with their anti- Communist 
efforts: “It is essential that we have the fullest cooperation from the Depart-
ment of Justice and the Immigration Department in our endeavors to curb 
these Communistic activities.”44 Here the governor suggested any problems 
were from foreign agitators within the labor movement, and the federal 
government failed in their tasks. The remedy, according to the governor, 
was for the federal government to provide support for the state to continue 
its mission of weeding out the communists.
 Governor Moeur also received pressure from within the state to stop 
the violence. The Southside Ministerial Association, for example, issued a 
resolution and petitioned the governor to use law enforcement agencies to 
stop the violence and arrest the bombers. Mr. Wilke of the Arizona Peace 
Officers’ Association told the governor in the beginning of November that 
something drastic needed to be done to end “this reign of terrorism” against 
Japanese and Hindu famers. These calls fell on deaf ears. By the end of 
that month, the Japanese Consulate wrote in clear exhaustion one last time 
about his distress that not a single perpetrator had been charged while the 
violence continued with no indication of any law enforcement efforts to 
help. In December, the governor once again dismissed accusations of acts 
against Hindu growers as exaggerations and ensured the Secretary of State 
it was under control.
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 While no action was taken against those engaged in terror in the fall and 
early winter of 1934, legal action against the Japanese farmers continued, 
and new ways to restrict access to land were devised. In the beginning of 
October, Governor Moeur formed a committee to look into the “problems 
surrounding the enforcement of Arizona’s Alien land law.” A new, even more 
stringent law was introduced into the state legislature in 1935 that would 
have prevented Japanese from leasing or even entering onto land to do any 
farm work. This law drew national attention, in part for further threatening 
diplomatic relations with Japan, and the governor was encouraged to veto 
it.45 The bill that would have challenged not just Japanese ownership of land 
but also potential use of Japanese labor by others did not pass.
 While the legislative responses of the states look similar, Arizona’s con-
troversy and enforcement of alien land laws surpassed those of New Mexico. 
Arizona’s alien land laws were targeting not just the small number of Japa-
nese farmers but also Chinese and Indian farmers. Here we see economic 
competition and a strong white identity driving Arizona’s subjugation of a 
broad range of outsiders. While the alien land laws of New Mexico were 
less aggressive than its neighbor’s, the existence of the laws and underlying 
anti- Japanese sentiment should be strongly noted. The land laws here were 
not focused on economic considerations, nor were they evidently met with 
the same grassroots violence seen elsewhere. There was a muted politics 
of exclusion.
 Similarly, during World War II, racialized understandings of loyalty 
drove responses in both states; their origin stories, however, influenced 
their responses to internment. The desire to exclude as well as to display 
their belonging to the nation dominated New Mexico’s response to Japanese 
and Japanese Americans during the war. While Arizona initially responded 
with a similarly racialized drive to exclude, as the war progressed, Arizona 
turned to the interned Japanese in response to labor shortages during the war. 
Again we see the binary labeling of states as either inclusive or exclusive 
ignores the nuanced negotiations often at work within a single state.
 In January of 1942, the federal government asked all non- US citizens who 
were Japanese (along with Germans and Italians) to re- register at post offices 
and receive a Certificate of Identification. The next month the United States 
Attorney General declared those areas that surrounded critical infrastructure 
restricted or prohibited. Eighteen such areas were declared in Arizona, caus-
ing the removal of “enemy aliens.” In New Mexico, Japanese enemy aliens 
from the Clovis area were taken into custody by Immigration Services and 
kept at Fort Stanton, an INS- operated detention area for prisoners of war 
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and enemy aliens.46 The early concentration of Japanese caused complaints 
from the nearby community in Capitan, leading the INS agent in charge 
to remove the school children due to the “hostile sentiments.”47 This was 
the beginning of what would be years of struggle in both New Mexico and 
Arizona with Japanese residence and relocation during World War II. New 
Mexico and Arizona initially hoped that relocation would mean moving 
Japanese Americans and Japanese out of the state, further east. Neither state 
welcomed the idea of inheriting new populations of Issei, first generation 
Japanese immigrants, or Nisei, second generation. Both states, however, 
became sites for internment camps.
 Prior to relocation, Arizona had about 630 individuals who would have 
been targeted for relocation, and many hoped they would be moved out of 
the state.48 Instead, Arizona became home to two large relocation centers, 
one near Poston that housed up to eighteen thousand people and one on 
the Gila River that housed up to thirteen thousand.49 New Mexico, which 
had over 180 Japanese who would be subject to internment, became the 
site of four different centers. Fort Stanton, Lordsburg, Santa Fe, and Old 
Ranton Ranch all held concentration camps during the war years, alternat-
ing between processing centers for Japanese internees, POW camps for 
Germans and Italians, and camps for Japanese and Japanese American men 
who were thought to be dangerous or causing trouble in the other internment 
camps.50 Between March 1942 and April 1946, over 4,500 men were held 
in the Santa Fe Camp alone.
 Racialized conceptions of loyalty and the support of relocation emerged 
from the highest offices and from the populace in both Arizona and New 
Mexico. Governor Osborn of Arizona noted of the Japanese who had been 
evacuated to Arizona, the “general attitude . . . is that while they would be 
willing to fight against Germany or Italy, they are not willing to fight against 
Japan” and that no Japanese Americans or Japanese have “denounce[d] the 
activities of . . . spies to our authorities.” These “facts,” Osborn concluded, 
meant that the loyalty of those of Japanese descent ultimately lay with a 
foreign government. The governor did not make a distinction based on 
whether one was born in the United States or not. However, when consider-
ing policy responses nativity mattered; for those Japanese not born in the 
United States the answer was clear: deportation. Meanwhile, “the disposi-
tion of native born Japanese is a very serious and vexatious question.”51 
The challenge was dealing with citizenship and attendant legal protections: 
“While a disposition of the native born citizens of Japanese blood is not 
so simple, still it must be worked out in line with realities. It is hard to use 
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sentiment and consideration for people who have shown that they regard 
such motives as weakness.”52 In language eerily similar to contemporary 
conversations about becoming radicalized by visits to the Middle East, 
he wrote that “particularly dangerous, are those who were born here and 
have visited Japan in the last ten years.”53 Loyalty was not about time in 
the United States but about race, as the loyalty of first generation Japanese 
“differs from young Americans of German or Italian parentage.”54
 Letters from citizens to the Governor of Arizona also displayed a view 
of loyalty and membership grounded in genetic predispositions: “They [the 
Japanese] are the most treacherous people on the earth and their words and 
promises does [sic] not mean a thing. It does not matter if they are U.S. 
citizens or not, they will put all their efforts in favor of Japan. . . . A Jap is 
and always will be a Jap in the interest of Japan.”55 The governor replied 
to the letter writer, C.H. Nelson, noting that most United States citizens 
agreed with his sentiment and that he believed the Japanese would not be 
“dumped” on Arizona; in fact, he noted, any Japanese currently residing 
in Arizona would be required to move further east.56 Organizations such 
as the Elks Lodge issued resolutions addressing the state being “infested” 
with Japanese, some of whom were actively plotting to attack America. 
Delay in addressing this problem would be “deadly.”57 While supportive of 
federal action and internment, Arizonans did not initially want the Japanese 
interned in Arizona. At the beginning of March 1942, the governor received 
an outpouring of support on the stand he took against resettling Japanese 
in Arizona.
 Similarly, New Mexico, while supportive of internment and concerned 
about the Japanese problem, did not want to see Japanese settling in the 
state. In early March, concerns about a plan to move forty to sixty thousand 
Japanese to New Mexico rippled through the state. The plan came from a 
private individual hoping to capitalize on brokering the deal; initial confu-
sion, however, led some to think the plan came from the federal government. 
Upon hearing of the plan, Governor Miles of New Mexico immediately 
informed the War Department that he supported interment, which they hoped 
would come with heavy guards, but opposed moving Japanese to the state 
in part because of the economic problems associated with such a massive 
resettlement: “The movement of Japanese seeking employment presents an 
entirely different problem. In fairness to all concerned, I believe I should 
point out at this time it will be virtually impossible for Japanese workers to 
find employment in New Mexico since we have a large number of our own 
residents idle and others dependent on the Wpa [sic] for their livelihood.”58 
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Communities throughout New Mexico protested such a move as well. The 
Espanola Chamber of Commerce offered to help forcibly put Japanese aliens 
or citizens of Japanese descent in “concentration camps,” but continued that 
they were “unalterabl[y] opposed to any colonization or the acquisition of 
land by the above classes.”59 The Albuquerque mayor Clyde Tingley said, 
“California can keep her Japs—she has plenty of desert to keep them in and 
so has Arizona.”60 In the mayor and former governor’s objection, we hear a 
demand for New Mexico not to be treated as a second- class state in relation 
to its southwest neighbors, harkening to their deep- seated insecurity of not 
being seen as a “Real American State.” The governor also made publicly 
known his stance against the unpoliced movement of Japanese into the 
state, adding that the threat to New Mexico was both economic and social 
in nature.61 The fears about Japanese “colonization” continued to stir citi-
zen concerns, even in the face of a lack of evidence about the sincerity of 
such a plan, causing, according to Richard Melzer, “a public outcry seldom 
equaled in New Mexico history.”62
 In Deming, on the border with Mexico, residents held a protest in response 
to rumors that 350 Japanese planned to arrive within a few weeks. The 
chairman of the Chamber of Commerce wrote to the governor applaud-
ing his stance against Japanese moving to New Mexico and supportive of 
further restrictions on Japanese owning land. He noted that the majority of 
residents stood firmly against Japanese moving to the area: “It so happens 
that we have had a few radical citizens who individually would like to see 
the Jap settlement. However, such citizens do not amount to one in a thou-
sand. You may rest assured that Luna County is back of you one hundred 
per cent in your effort.”63 In Maxwell, New Mexico, a debate over selling 
land for a Japanese settlement revealed how the desire to exclude Japanese 
in the state was stronger than the lure of economic benefits to be gained 
by their settlement. Many voiced opposition to the settlement of some two 
hundred Japanese families in the area, but the mayor suggested that those 
petitions in opposition were not representative of the city and certainly not 
of landowners. After the mayor interviewed almost all the resident farmers 
of the area, thirty- two signed a petition in favor of Japanese settlement and 
thirteen did not. The mayor noted that eleven of the thirteen preferred not to 
sign but would be willing to sell their land to Japanese, indicating concerns 
about how a signature on a petition supporting Japanese settlement would be 
perceived.64 Governor Miles, however, fully opposed to settlement of Japa-
nese, called on the Attorney General Edward Chase to investigate limits on 
the capacity of anyone of “the Japanese race” to acquire real estate in New 
JAEH 37_3 text.indd   25 3/26/18   11:06 AM
This content downloaded from 
            134.82.100.109 on Mon, 18 Mar 2019 12:56:19 UTC              
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
26 Journal of American Ethnic History / Spring 2018
Mexico through legal proceedings, and if necessary bring a case, funded by 
the governor, to the Supreme Court.65 He also encouraged western governors 
to participate in the effort to bring a test case to encourage the Supreme Court 
to revisit an earlier ruling that the children of Japanese immigrants born 
in the United States should be granted birthright citizenship status.66 The 
potential economic benefit to the Maxwell farmers, then, was not enough 
to overcome the governor’s anti- Japanese sentiment, which echoed much of 
the popular sentiment from around the state. Maxwell was the exception to 
the rule in New Mexico, which included anti- Japanese associations forming 
in places like Doña Ana County and pledges from land owners not to sell 
land to the Japanese, thousands in Mesilla Valley alone.67
 While many western governors agreed on the issue of Japanese internment 
and relocation, the Oregon governor’s unorthodox stance shows that this 
was not an inevitable response to this pressure. Governor Sprague advo-
cated investigating individual Japanese families and allowing those shown 
to be dependable to live privately and to be dispersed, not concentrated. He 
hoped that this would “prevent the deterioration of Japanese- Americans 
into citizens with anti- American feelings and we will enable them to make 
effective contribution of their labor.”68 While Sprague noted the possibil-
ity of Japanese labor being a contribution, such labor in New Mexico was 
understood as competition.
 Arizona came to capitalize on Japanese labor and further marginalize 
the population so they would not be economic competitors. In March 1943, 
Arizona enacted a law that required anyone with business dealings with 
“persons of restricted movement” to register the transaction in triplicate. 
The Gila News- Courier, a paper published by those at the Gila relocation 
center, noted that this law would eliminate the ability of persons of Japa-
nese ancestry from conducting any business. The interned Japanese writing 
the editorial believed that “with this law California’s restrictionaries have 
been outdone in a discriminatory, un- American practice.”69 This law moved 
further toward the marginalized and pliable labor desired in Arizona.
 During the war there was a shortage of labor to pick the long staple cotton 
grown uniquely in Arizona and centrally important to the war effort as it was 
used to weave parachutes for the military. The governor and other actors in 
the state considered a wide range of different groups to help fill this role. 
Individuals incarcerated in the state prison in Florence were made to pick 
the cotton. Papagos, or native Indians who moved back and forth across the 
border, were also key to the cotton- picking effort.70 Japanese internees were 
another source of workers used to address the labor shortage. The governor, 
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along with representatives from various affected counties, requested and 
received approval from General Dewitt and the War Relocation Authority to 
recruit up to eighteen thousand interned Japanese to work the in the cotton 
fields.71 Arizona moved quickly from an initial desire to exclude Japanese 
and Japanese Americans at the start of the war to understanding them as 
another group ripe for racial subjugation feeding the white state.
 Indicative of the neo- confederate Anglo identity driving the search for 
labor at this time, when General Dewitt rescinded permission to employ 
internees in November, the governor requested “colored” soldiers stationed 
at Huachuca be asked to pick the cotton. There was pushback against such 
a request, both from within the army and from others. The secretary of the 
NAACP wrote: “It is characteristic of uninformed white people to think that 
the mentality of the majority of Negroes is such that prior to enlistment in 
the Army they could do nothing but pick cotton. There is further affirma-
tion of your derogatory attitude towards American Negro citizens in the 
fact that you conspicuously neglected to include in your request that white 
soldiers stationed in Arizona be assigned as cotton pickers.”72 The gover-
nor responded to the NAACP denying that he asked specifically for black 
soldiers but any soldiers in the state who were available. In other writing 
on the matter, however, he was more revealing; he noted that many black 
soldiers from Huachuca might “know nothing about picking cotton. On the 
other hand, I am sure that we all agree that many are experienced cotton 
pickers.”73 Turning from Japanese workers to other groups, the search for 
pliant labor highlights racial subjugation at the core of Arizona’s political 
culture.
 Japanese interned labor was used to fulfill other needs in Arizona, includ-
ing the production of camouflage nets or training models for the navy, as 
well as needed infrastructure in the state. The land for the Poston Reloca-
tion Center, leased from the Department of the Interior, was sited on the 
Colorado River Indian Tribe reservation. Before the war, the reservation 
lacked critical infrastructure, such as irrigation, preventing relocation of a 
larger population of Native Americans. Internment provided a way to draw 
federal dollars and free labor to build up the reservation. The Japanese and 
Japanese Americans confined to the sprawling complex at Poston devel-
oped schools, dams, roads, and canals transforming the Indian reservation. 
After the war, the Office of Indian Affairs was able to attract more tribes 
to live in the revitalized reservation, now with productive farms. As tribes 
were consolidated at Poston they took up residence in the very housing the 
Japanese and Japanese American workers had lived.
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SpACES OF INCLUSION AND ExCLUSION  
IN ARIZONA AND NEW MExICO
 Through the early twentieth century, a time when federal power had 
unquestionable supremacy in the realm of immigration, we see immigrants 
encountering different terrains in two neighboring states. New Mexico and 
Arizona, although neither a bastion of American pluralism during the tumul-
tuous war years, have distinctive traditions that informed their responses 
to new national pressures. Arizona’s strategy of entering the union through 
promises of marginalizing its non- Anglo population, fulfilled through denial 
of fundamental citizenship rights, cast a long shadow of economic and politi-
cal subordination of racial others that informed each subsequent interaction 
on questions of how to respond to immigrant residents. German immigrants 
were a danger when they threatened native Anglo economic superiority. 
Arizona quickly found a use for Japanese and Japanese Americans during 
World War II in their racially stratified labor system. New Mexico’s origin 
story, replete with promises of pluralism and power sharing, established 
different pressures. The claim to include Spanish- speaking Americans as 
full and equal partners in governance sat uncomfortably with notions of 
race in the United States at the time, leaving New Mexico with the need to 
continually reassert their “Americaness.” As a result, New Mexico vigor-
ously fought the inclusion of European and Japanese immigrant groups in 
the first four decades of the twentieth century.
 Comparing these two states, then, allows us to discern how the economic 
and political clout of ethnic and racial groups can be mediated by the racial 
terrains and narratives of belonging that are distinctive to particular states or 
subnational places. In Arizona, for example, official responses to immigrants 
can only be understood in light of the ways newcomers impacted white 
economic dominance in the state. In New Mexico, one cannot understand 
the treatment meted out to new immigrants without an eye to the ongoing 
power sharing between Anglos and Hispanos. But the extraordinary power 
sharing between these two groups enshrined in the state’s constitution and 
subsequent political processes contributed to an enduring insecurity about 
not being part of the dominant Anglo American landscape through World 
War II.
 The history of each state presents a challenge to the idea of a simple 
binary of inclusive or exclusive treatment of immigrants or to a static notion 
of states’ approaches to immigrants. New Mexico’s repression of the use of 
German during World War I cannot be disentangled from earlier protections 
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of Spanish in its constitution. Limited pluralism for some can beget exclu-
sion for others in later moments, especially when power sharing with non- 
Anglos yields an unsure footing within the nation. The legacies of a state’s 
formative experience can be long and uneven. The prohibitions against 
aliens holding land in New Mexico, a powerful declaration of New Mexico’s 
Americanness at the time, was only removed from its constitution in 2006. 
While New Mexico was one of the last states to retain the remnants of the 
alien land laws,74 the removal was not uncontested. Only four years earlier 
a ballot measure to remove the language failed to pass.
 Moving beyond simple binaries of ethnic and immigrant reception also 
squares with the fact that immigration is a powerful cross- cutting issue in 
American politics, one that defies the standard liberal- conservative divide 
and often polarizes major party coalitions. As discussed in earlier work, 
four rather durable ideological traditions have emerged over time in US 
debates and political struggles over immigration.75 Historically, US cosmo-
politans like Jane Addams and Horace Kallen embraced the universality 
of the American experiment, professing deep faith in the social, economic, 
cultural, and political benefits of diverse mass immigration. By contrast, 
nationalist egalitarians (protectionists) opposed porous borders and soaring 
immigration on the grounds that they imperil the material security of the 
nation’s working class and its least advantaged citizens. In the 1870s, for 
instance, Frederick Douglass favored limits on immigration, lamenting that 
“every hour sees the black man elbowed out of employment by some newly 
arrived immigrant.”76 Free- market expansionists (pro- business conserva-
tives) historically tended to favor an unfettered flow of immigrant labor to 
meet the needs of various US employers while opposing broad immigrant 
rights. During the Gilded Age, capitalists like Andrew Carnegie described 
the flow of tractable immigrant workers into the country as a “golden 
stream,” valuing each newcomer as worth $1500 because “in former days 
an efficient slave sold for that sum.”77 Finally, classic restrictionists have 
responded to significant shifts in the ethnic, racial, or religious composi-
tion of immigration by advocating stringent border control, tough limits on 
alien rights, and reductions in immigrant admissions. As Harvard President 
A. Lawrence Lowell, a supporter of the Immigration Restriction League 
(IRL), argued during the Progressive Era, “the need for homogeneity in a 
democracy” justifies policies “resisting the influx of great numbers of a 
greatly different race.”78
 Tellingly, the ethnic politics and immigrant policies of Arizona and New 
Mexico during the first decades of the twentieth century reflect not one, 
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but several of these ideological traditions. Arizona policymakers clearly 
embraced most of the classic restrictionist ideals and goals of Lowell, the 
IRL, and other nativists. This was particularly true of their ardent support 
for Asian exclusion, literacy test legislation, and the rise of the national 
origins quota system. Yet Arizona’s leadership also shared the free- market 
conservatism of Carnegie, aggressively pursuing cheap, tractable labor to 
meet the demands of its farming, mining, and ranching enterprises. New 
Mexico’s ethnic and immigrant politics during these years also defy simple 
characterization. Compared to Arizona’s system of racial subjugation, the 
ethnic power sharing of New Mexican leaders and the defense of Hispano 
and Mexican American political rights comes close to realizing many of 
the key ideals of cosmopolitans like Addams and Kallen. Yet their uneasy 
claims of national belonging, especially during depression and wartime, 
fed restrictionist and protectionist tendencies in response to German and 
Japanese immigrants.
 Understanding the differing state responses to immigrants adds a vital, 
often overlooked element to our understanding of American immigration 
history. Federal government policies and national pressures mediated by 
state governments and local communities have the capacity to create decid-
edly different experiences for immigrants depending on the specific places 
where they live. While both Arizona and New Mexico put into place alien 
land laws, for instance, the vigorous and violent enforcement in Arizona 
against a range of immigrant groups was absent in New Mexico. Likewise, 
the federal government’s efforts to encourage spying on one’s German neigh-
bors during World War I was taken up with unmatched enthusiasm in New 
Mexico. Today, as in the past, the American immigrant experience has been 
shaped over time by not just who an immigrant is and when one arrives, but 
also where one settles within the United States.
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